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I.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from (i) an Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff dated
December 9, 1994 ("First Summary Judgment Order"), (ii) an Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment dated October 26, 1995 ("Second Summary Judgment Order"), and (iii)
a Judgment of Specific Performance dated December 14, 1995 ("Specific Performance
Judgment").1 The Specific Performance Judgment was, by stipulation of all parties and order
of court, certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court
is vested with jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

n.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The single issue presented for review in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in
granting the motion of appellee Robert J. Walter ("Buyer") for summary judgment that the
parties reached an enforceable contract to sell and purchase a parcel of real property in the face
of substantial direct and inferential evidence that appellants (collectively, "Sellers") revoked their
offer to sell the property before the Buyer completed his attempted acceptance of the offer.

1

A copy of the First Summary Judgment Order, the Second Summary Judgment Order, and the Specific
Performance Judgment is attached to this brief as Addenda A, B, and C, respectively. The First Summary
Judgment Order was entered by the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, and the Second Summary Judgment Order and
the Specific Performance Judgment were entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel of the Third Judicial District
Court of Summit County.

1

This issue2 is a question of law to which this Court will not defer to the trial court but
will review the trial court's determinations for correctness. Pratt by and Through Pratt v.
Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co.. 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Inasmuch as this appeal is taken from the entry of summary judgment
against the Sellers, this Court must review the facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the Sellers. Pratt, 813 P.2d at 1171; Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah
1991).
III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules whose interpretation
is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on appeal. However, one of the grounds on
which the trial court found that the Buyer's acceptance preceded the Sellers' revocation was that
the Buyer's agent was in an independent contractor relationship with her brokerage company.
According to the trial court, this relationship precluded the Buyer's agent from being imputed
with the Sellers' notice to her brokerage company of the Sellers' decision to revoke. Rule
6.2.9.2 of the Rules of the Utah Division of Real Estate is, therefore, directly relevant to this
appeal. That Rule, a copy of which is attached as Addenda D, states that ,![t]he existence of an
independent contractor relationship or any other special compensation arrangement between the

2

This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 25-35, 53-65, 161-71, 295-308, and 527-57.

2

broker and affiliated licensees shall not release the broker and licensees of any duties,
obligations, or responsibilities."
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The Buyer commenced this case to enforce a contract that he allegedly reached with the
Sellers for the purchase and sale of a valuable parcel of unimproved real property ("Property")
in Deer Valley, Utah. (R. 12-22). The Buyer's principal claim was for a decree of specific
performance compelling the Sellers to convey title to the Property upon payment of $967,350.
(R. 12-15, 745-50).
The Sellers counterclaimed against the Buyer for a declaratory judgment that because the
Sellers revoked their offer to sell the Property before the Buyer accepted, the parties never
reached an enforceable agreement to sell or purchase the Property. (R. 25-31). The Sellers
subsequently impleaded their real estate agents, alleging that if the court concluded that the
Sellers and Buyer actually reached an enforceable agreement to transfer the Property, the Sellers'
agents had breached their obligations to timely and effectively revoke the Sellers' offer before
the Buyer accepted the offer. (R. 237-46).
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court.

Several months after the Buyer filed his complaint, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on the issue of whether the Buyer's attempted acceptance of the Sellers' offer

3

to sell the Property preceded or followed the Sellers' revocation of the offer. (R. 53-65, 79-122,
161-99). In its First Summary Judgment Order, the court concluded that because the Buyer's
agent was an "independent contractor" and not an "employee" of the brokerage company with
whom she was affiliated " . . . she was not imputed with any knowledge that [the brokerage
company] or [the Sellers' agent] may have had relating to [the Sellers'] attempt to revoke their
counteroffer." (R. 369). The court further concluded in the First Summary Judgment Order
that the Buyer's agent had no knowledge of the Sellers' revocation of their offer " . . . until after
she had communicated [the Buyer's] acceptance of the offer to [the Sellers'] agent." (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, the court denied the Buyer's motion for summary judgment "on the
disputed issue as to whether [the Sellers'] revocation of the counter-offer preceded or followed
[the Buyer's] acceptance of said counter-offer," holding that"... there remain factual disputes"
which, if resolved through further discovery, could be adjudicated through a renewed motion
for summary judgment. (R. 361).
After additional discovery was conducted, the Buyer filed a renewed motion for summary
judgment, arguing that there was no factual dispute that the Buyer accepted the Sellers' offer
before the Sellers revoked it.

(R. 484-526). In granting the Buyer's motion, the court

concluded in the Second Summary Judgment Order that "[the Sellers] had failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the Buyer] was
notified of [the Sellers'] attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his acceptance;" that "[t]he
record demonstrates that [the Buyer] was not informed of [the Sellers'] attempt to revoke their

4

counteroffer until after his acceptance was communicated to [the Sellers'] real estate agent;" and
that "[the Sellers'] arguments regarding the subject matter of any communications between the
parties' real estate agents that allegedly occurred before [the Buyer] accepted the counteroffer
are mere speculation and do not create a genuine issue of material fact upon which reasonable
minds could differ." (R. 738-39).
On December 15, 1995, the court entered the Specific Performance Judgment which
directed the Sellers to convey the Property to the Buyer upon payment of the sum of $967,350.
(R. 746-49). Several days later, the Sellers filed their notice of appeal. (R. 751-52).
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December 1993, the Sellers signed a listing contract with Bald Eagle Realty
("Brokerage Company") for the purpose of selling the Property. (R. 129-31). The listing
contract designated both the Brokerage Company and its principal broker, Jonathan Olch
("Mr. Olch"), as the Sellers' agents.

(Listing Contract, 1 6; R. 129).

Janet Olch

("Mrs. Olch"), an affiliate of the Brokerage Company and the wife of Mr. Olch, served as the
Buyer's agent. (R. 123-24). Mr. and Mrs. Olch's assistant at the Brokerage Company was Kate
Doordan ("Doordan").3 (R. 559, 576). The scope of Doordan's duties for Mrs. Olch was
broad: Mrs. Olch had given Doordan authority to sign checks on her behalf; to assist her in
transmitting offers, counteroffers, acceptances and other communications between transacting
3

Mr. Olch, as the principal broker and sole shareholder of the Brokerage Company, testified in his deposition
that Doordan's " . . . job description might more accurately be described as my wife's assistant." (R. 576).
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parties; and to draft and transmit letters to Mrs. Olch's clients, including the Buyer in this case.
(R. 593-95, 605-10, 625).
On January 16, 1994, the Buyer signed and delivered to the Sellers a written offer
("Offer") to purchase the Property for $880,000. (R. 71, 133). The Offer, a copy of which is
attached as Addenda E, specified the only manner in which it could be accepted:
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer,
responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the
offer or counter where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b)
communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the
offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
In response to the Offer, the Sellers signed and delivered to Mrs. Olch a counteroffer
("Counteroffer") offering to sell the Property for $967,350. (R. 72, 136, 746-49). Mrs. Olch
then had her assistant, Doordan, compose and type a cover letter to accompany the Counteroffer
to the Buyer. (R. 594, 610). The Counteroffer, a copy of which is attached as Addenda F,
provided that the Buyer had until January 28, 1994 " . . . to accept the terms of this
[Counteroffer] in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of [the Offer]." (R. 136). The
Buyer never understood that the Counteroffer was irrevocable. (R. 104).
On January 27, 1994 at 2:02 p.m., the Sellers called the Brokerage Company's office
in Park City, Utah to revoke the Counteroffer. (R. 559). The Sellers' call to the Brokerage
Company was answered by Doordan - Mrs. Olch's assistant. (R. 559, 576). The Sellers knew
at that time that Doordan was an assistant for both Mr. Olch and Mrs. Olch and that Doordan
was and had been available to resolve transactional issues that had previously arisen in
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connection with the Property. (R. 559-60). Informed that Mr. Olch was not in the office, the
Sellers told Doordan that they had decided to withdraw the Counteroffer and instructed her to
immediately take all action necessary to accomplish that purpose. (R. 560, 613-15). Doordan
said she would do so. (R. 560, 613-15). The Sellers' telephone call with Doordan lasted for
six minutes, terminating at 2:07 p.m. (R. 560, 564).4
After receiving the Sellers' instruction to revoke the Counteroffer, Doordan's "mind set"
was to assure that Mr. Olch was informed of that fact. (R. 615). Doordan accordingly felt a
"sense of urgency" to take care of the matter. (R. 587). She knew that when Mr. Olch was not
in the office, he would take his cellular telephone with him and that she could reach him on that
phone if she " . . . had something to tell him." (R. 611). "Responding as quickly as she could
to [the Sellers'] request [to revoke the Counteroffer]," R. 587, Doordan reached Mr. Olch on
his cellular telephone in Salt Lake City and told him that the Sellers had "just called" to revoke
the Counteroffer. (R. 586-87). Mr. Olch's cellular telephone records reflect an incoming call

4

The proposition that a six minute telephone call that begins at 2:02 p.m. terminates by 2:07 p.m. is illustrated
as follows:
Time of Call

Number of Minutes Elapsed

2:02 p.m.
2:03 p.m.
2:04 p.m.
2:05 p.m.
2:06 p.m.
2:07 p.m.

1
2
3
4
5
6

Because Doordan's telephone conference with the Sellers ended at 2:07 p.m., Doordan was physically able
to call Mr. Olch during the same minute at 2:07 p.m. (the point at which his cellular telephone bill reflects his
receipt of an incoming call from Park City) with the news that the Sellers had just revoked the Counteroffer.
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from Park City5 — the location at which the Sellers had just reached Doordan — which began
at 2:07 p.m., the same minute during which the telephone conversation between the Sellers and
Doordan ended. (R. 557). This call between Doordan and Mr. Olch lasted for three minutes.
(Id.).
Two minutes later at 2:11 p.m., Mr. Olch called the Buyer's agent, Mrs. Olch (his wife),
at her home office. (R. 553, 598). Although this call lasted for three minutes and came on the
heels of Doordan's two-minute-old telephone conversation with Mr. Olch, the Olches - who
stood to make a combined commission of nearly $60,000 if the Buyer purchased the Property
— both denied that Mr. Olch told Mrs. Olch at this time that the Sellers had revoked the
Counteroffer. (R. 125, 579-80).6 Although the Counteroffer, by its terms, was to remain open
until the following day at 5:00 p.m., Mrs. Olch told Mr. Olch during their telephone

5

The Buyer submitted an affidavit from the telephone provider that the reference to "Park City" on the bill did
not necessarily mean that it originated in Park City. (R. 688-90). However, given the undisputed fact that
Doordan's call to Mr. Olch immediately followed the six-minute call she received from the Sellers beginning at
2:02 p.m., the inference is irresistible that it was Doordan who called Mr. Olch at 2:07 p.m. to inform him of the
Sellers' revocation.
6

As demonstrated in Argument B at pages 14-18 infra, the Olches' denial is unconvincing. Mr. Olch's call
to his wife was initiated only two minutes after Doordan told him of the Sellers' revocation of the Counteroffer.
His call was an immediate, spontaneous reaction designed to impart to Mrs. Olch the critical information that he
had just received from Doordan. It defies credulity to believe that during their three minute discussion Mr. Olch
never once raised with Mrs. Olch the subject of the Sellers' minutes-old revocation. At a factual level, Mr. Olch
was well aware of the Sellers' revocation and had three minutes of easy, unfettered opportunity to tell his wife of
the revocation. At a legal level, Mr. Olch owed the Sellers an undivided fiduciary duty of loyalty and diligence
to immediately inform his wife of the revocation. At an intuitive level, it makes no sense that Mr. Olch discoursed
with his wife on any topic other than the one Doordan had only moments earlier so urgently and unequivocally
raised with him. The inference is irresistible, therefore, that Mrs. Olch - the Buyer's agent - was informed of
the Sellers' revocation by 2:14 p.m., some seventy minutes before the Buyer's attempted acceptance at
approximately 3:25 p.m.
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conversation at 2:11 p.m. that she was then feeling ". . . a sense of urgency about getting [the
Buyer's] signed acceptance back from Ohio." (R. 591).7
In the meantime, "no later than 3:25" that afternoon, R. 173, Doordan called the Buyer's
"administrative assistant," R. 491,8 in Ohio and read her the following message:
Jim Berkus the current owner of Lot 14 has instructed me to send
you this message. He is reconsidering his position in this
transaction and in his words 'taking the offer off the table' for 24
hours. He will make a decision by 2:10 p.m. MST on Friday,
January 28. I am acting in the absence of Jon Olch and acting on
the authority of Jim Berkus.
At the same time -- 3:25 p.m. — Doordan telefaxed the foregoing notification to the Buyer's
office. (R. 623). At "approximately 3:25 p.m.," Mrs. Olch told Mr. Olch that the Buyer had
signed the Counteroffer.

(R.125).9 It is unclear from the deposition testimony whether

Doordan's telephonic notification to the Buyer's administrative assistant "no later than

7

Mr. Olch testified in his deposition that he did not know why his wife felt this "sense of urgency." (R. 591).
The obvious explanation, however, is that he in fact told his wife (the Buyer's agent) of the Sellers' revocation
during their 2:11 p.m. telephone conversation.
In any event, Mrs. Olch testified that her increasing "concern" about getting the Buyer to fax his signed
acceptance to her was prompted by her knowledge that " . . . there was another offer [from a third-party] about to
be submitted or there were some other people getting close to the lot." (R. 599). Indeed, Mrs. Olch's level of
"concern" about expediting the Buyer's return of the signed acceptance of the Counteroffer was higher " . . .
between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on the 27th than it had been before." (R. 599). Given the fact that the
Counteroffer was, by its own terms, to remain open until 5:00 p.m. the following day, Mrs. Olch's explanation as
to why her anxiety level was rapidly escalating is implausible.
8

Mrs. Olch understood that the Buyer's administrative assistant had responsibility for doing "the actual faxing"
of the Counteroffer. (R. 602). To the extent that Mrs. Olch was unable to reach the Buyer, she would
"sometimes" speak with the Buyer's administrative assistant. (Id.).
9

Thus, it was not until "approximately 3:25 p.m." that the Buyer finally completed his acceptance of the
Counteroffer in the manner required by paragraph 23 of the initial Offer by having his agent inform the Sellers'
agent that he had signed the Counteroffer.
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3:25 p.m." preceded or followed Mrs. Olch's notification to Mr. Olch at "approximately 3:25
p.m." that she had just received the Buyer's signed acceptance of the Counteroffer. (R. 588-90,
603, 616, 620, 623, 624).
In the face of these facts, the trial court nevertheless concluded as a matter of a law that
the Buyer's acceptance of the Counteroffer preceded the Sellers' revocation of the Counteroffer.
(R. 738-39). On that basis, the court ruled that the parties reached a specifically enforceable
agreement. (R. 746-49).
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There are three independent reasons why the trial court's Summary Judgment Orders
must be reversed.
First, the record establishes that Doordan — the assistant for the Buyer's agent — was
actually serving or apparently serving as an agent for the Buyer's agent in the attempted sale and
purchase of the Property. As such, when the Sellers notified Doordan at 2:02 p.m. of their
intent to revoke the Counteroffer, the notification was, as a matter of law, imputed both to the
Buyer's agent and the Buyer.

Because that notification preceded the Buyer's attempted

acceptance, no contract arose. The Summary Judgment Orders and the Specific Performance
Judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the Sellers as a matter of law.
Next, there is strong circumstantial evidence that during their 2:11 p.m. telephone call,
the Buyer's agent was actually notified by the Sellers' agent that the Counteroffer had been
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revoked. This notification was made more than one hour before the Buyer completed his
attempted acceptance of the Counteroffer at "approximately 3:25 p.m." The sequence and
timing of the flurry of telephone calls between the Sellers and Doordan, between Doordan and
Mr. Olch, between Mr. Olch and Mrs. Olch, and between Mrs. Olch and the Buyer support the
reasonable inference that the Buyer's agent was well aware of the Sellers' revocation before the
Buyer completed his acceptance. This inference, by itself, creates a triable issue of fact as to
whether the Sellers' revocation of the Counteroffer preceded or followed the Buyer's acceptance.
Finally, the factual record does not establish whether the Buyer's attempted completion
of his acceptance of the Counteroffer at "approximately 3:25 p.m." occurred before or after
Doordan telephonically notified the Buyer's administrative assistant and faxed the notice of
revocation to the Buyer at "no later than 3:25 p.m." This plainly important triable issue of fact
precludes the entry of summary judgment.
VII.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT DOORDAN WAS ACTUALLY SERVING
OR APPARENTLY SERVING AS AN AGENT FOR THE BUYER'S REAL
ESTATE BROKER. AS SUCH. THE SELLERS' NOTIFICATION TO HER AT
2:02 P.M. OF THEIR INTENT TO REVOKE THE COUNTEROFFER
CONSTITUTES NOTIFICATION TO THE BUYER.
BECAUSE THAT
NOTIFICATION PRECEDED THE BUYER'S ATTEMPTED COMPLETION OF
HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE COUNTEROFFER AT 3:35 P.M., NO CONTRACT
AROSE.
It is a basic rule of agency law that "[u]nless the notifier has notice that the agent has an

interest adverse to the principal, a notification given to an agent is notice to the principal if it
11

is given to an agent authorized to receive it [or] to an agent apparently authorized to receive it."
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 268(l)(a) and (b) (1958). This rule applies with equal force
to " . . . a servant, subservant or other subagent which the servant or subagent had a duty to act
upon or to communicate to the agent or to the principal because of his employment or apparent
employment." Id. at § 283(a). "A person has notice of a fact if his agent has knowledge of the
fact, reason to know it or should know it, or has been given a notification of it, under
circumstances coming within the rules applying to the liability of a principal because of notice
to his agent." Id. at § 9(3). Therefore, " . . . notice to a subagent who is under a duty to
communicate the notice to the agent is effective to the same extent as if notice had been given
to the agent." Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co.. 736 P.2d 391, 396 (Colo. 1987).
These settled principles of agency law cannot be circumvented by attaching the label of
"independent contractor" to describe the legal relationship between the Buyer's agent and her
husband's Brokerage Company with whom she was affiliated.

Rule 6.2.9.2 of the

Administrative Rules of the Division of Real Estate, see Addenda D, states that "[t]he existence
of an independent contractor relationship or any other special compensation arrangement between
the broker and affiliated licensee shall not release the broker and licensees of any duties,
obligations, or responsibilities." In other words, the Buyer's agent cannot insulate herself from
notifications given to her assistant by claiming that she or her assistant is an independent
contractor, and not an employee, of the Brokerage Company.
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The record in this case establishes that Doordan served as Mrs. Olch's assistant and
performed significant work for Mrs. Olch in connection with the Property. Mr. Olch — the
principal broker and president of the Brokerage Company — testified in his deposition that
Doordan's " . . . job description might more accurately be described as my wife's assistant."
(R. 576). The scope of Doordan's duties for Mrs. Olch was extensive: Mrs. Olch had given
Doordan authority to sign checks on her behalf; to assist her in transmitting offers,
counteroffers, acceptances and other communications between transacting parties; and to prepare
and transmit letters to Mrs. Olch's clients, including the Buyer. (R. 593-95, 605-10, 625). Not
only did Doordan have actual authority to act on Mrs. Olch's behalf, she had apparent authority
to do so. The Sellers knew from their previous contacts with Doordan that she was closely
involved with communicating the respective positions of the parties, including the faxing of
transactional documents. (R. 559). The Sellers' agent had previously informed the Sellers that
Doordan was assisting both the Sellers' agent and the Buyer's agent in connection with the sale
of the Property and that if the Sellers' agent was unavailable, Doordan would have up-to-the
minute information as to its status. (Id.).
Doordan's role as Mrs. Olch's assistant — a role in which Doordan was authorized to
perform and in fact performed significant transactional functions for Mrs. Olch — renders
Doordan a subagent of the Buyer. Because Doordan was serving as the Buyer's subagent, the
Buyer is, as a matter of law, deemed to have notice of the Sellers' revocation at 2:02 p.m. on
January 27, 1994. Restatement (Second) of Agency. §§ 9(3), 268 and 283 (1958). Therefore,
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the Counteroffer was revoked more than one hour before the Buyer completed his attempted
acceptance at "about 3:25 p.m." Thus, as a matter of law, no contract was ever reached. At
the very least, there is a hotly disputed factual issue regarding the nature and extent of
Doordan's legal relationship with the Brokerage Company, with the Buyer's agent, and with the
Buyer. This factual dispute is fatal to the Summary Judgment Orders.
B.

BECAUSE THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH COMPELLING
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE BUYER'S AGENT, MRS, OLCH.
WAS INFORMED OF THE SELLERS' REVOCATION OF THE
COUNTEROFFER BEFORE THE BUYER COMPLETED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF
THE COUNTEROFFER, THE SELLERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THAT EVIDENCE,
Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, "[i]t only takes one sworn statement

under oath to dispute the averments on either side of the controversy and create an issue of
fact." Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). A triable issue of fact exists
when the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence create a genuine dispute about
a material point of the case. CJL Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min.. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304,
1307-08 (Utah 1987). This Court has long held that the party against whom summary judgment
is sought " . . . is entitled to the benefit of having the court consider all the facts presented, and
every inference fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to him."

Morris v.

Farnsworth Motel. 259 P.2d 297, 298 (Utah 1953).
This basic principle of summary judgment practice has been repeatedly recognized. See
e.g. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1993) ("we view the facts and
inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing a motion for
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summary judgment"); Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App.
1989) ("because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the
merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the opposing party"); Frederick May
& Co. v. Dunn. 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962) ("to sustain a summary judgment, the
pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the loser,
must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable
possibility that the loser could win if given a trial").
The process of drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence in the context of a
motion for summary judgment has been usefully explained as follows:
Inferences must also be drawn in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party . . . .
Inferences may be drawn from
underlying facts that are not in dispute, such as background or
contextual facts . . . , and from underlying facts on which there is
conflicting direct evidence but which the judge must assume may
be resolved at trial in favor of the non-moving party. Assuming
the existence of these underlying facts, however, an inference as
to another material fact may be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party only if it is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and otherwise
permissible under the governing substantive law.
McLaughlin v. Liu. 849 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1988). In other words, the court can
refuse to draw the requested inference from circumstantial evidence only if the inference is
"implausible." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 593 (1986).
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In this case, the inference that plaintiffs agent, Mrs. Olch, had actual knowledge of the
Sellers' revocation before the Buyer attempted to accept the Counteroffer is anything but
"implausible." Matsushita. 475 U.S. at 593. In a telephone call from 2:02 p.m. to 2:07 p.m.,
the Sellers told Doordan that they had decided to revoke the Counteroffer.

(R. 559). The

Sellers instructed her to immediately take all action, if any, necessary to complete the
revocation. (R. 560, 613-15). Doordan was acutely aware of the need to take "immediate"
action and felt a "sense of urgency." (R. 587, 615). She immediately called the Sellers' agent,
Mr. Olch, and told him of the Sellers' revocation. (R. 586-87). Less than three minutes later
at 2:11 p.m. - 39 minutes before the Buyer affixed his signature to the Counteroffer to signify
his "acceptance" and about 74 minutes before that "acceptance" was communicated to the
Sellers' agent in the manner required by the Counteroffer - Mr. Olch spoke with the Buyer's
agent, Mrs. Olch. (R. 553, 598).
Astoundingly, Mr. Olch denies that he informed his wife during this conversation of the
Sellers' revocation.10 His denial ignores the reality that his telephone call was an immediate,
spontaneous reaction designed to impart to Mrs. Olch the critical information that he had just
received from Doordan. It is preposterous to believe that during their three minute discussion
10

Mr. Olch does, however, acknowledge that Mrs. Olch told him during this call that even though the
Counteroffer stated that it was to remain open until the following day at 5:00 p.m., she felt "a sense of urgency
about getting [the Buyer's] signed acceptance [of the Counteroffer] back from Ohio." (R. 591). This "sense of
urgency" became one of apparent desperation. Only fourteen minutes after her telephone conversation with Mr.
Olch, and 32 minutes after her last telephone conversation with the Buyer, Mrs. Olch again attempted to call the
Buyer. (R. 633). When the Buyer returned that call several minutes later at 2:39 p.m., Mrs. Olch " . . . knew that
[the Buyer] had to get going on [signing and returning the Counteroffer]." (R. 600). This clear sense of urgency
supports the inference that Mrs. Olch ~ the Buyer's agent — knew from her previous discussion with Mr. Olch at
2:11 p.m. that the Sellers had revoked the Counteroffer.
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Mr. Olch never once raised with Mrs. Olch the subject of the Sellers' seconds-old revocation.
Factually, Mr. Olch well knew of the Sellers' revocation and had three minutes of unrestricted
opportunity to tell his wife of the revocation. Legally, Mr. Olch owed the Sellers an undivided
fiduciary duty of loyalty and due care to promptly inform his wife of the revocation. Intuitively,
it makes no sense that Mr. Olch discoursed with his wife on any subject other than the one
Doordan had only moments earlier so urgently raised with him. The inference is irresistible,
therefore, that Mrs. Olch -- the Buyer's agent ~ was informed of the Sellers' revocation by 2:14
p.m., some seventy minutes before the Buyer completed his attempted acceptance at about
3:25 p.m.
Moreover, between 2:15 and 2:40 p.m. that day, Mr. Olch learned that another
prospective buyer had submitted a back-up offer to purchase the Property. (R. 583). Mr. Olch
advised Mrs. Olch of this development "shortly" thereafter. (R. 588). Mrs. Olch acknowledges
that she learned of the back-up offer from Mr. Olch or Doordan sometime after 1:30 p.m.
(R.596, 597, 601). Thus, there is a strong inference that even if Mr. Olch inexplicably failed
to advise Mrs. Olch during their three-minute telephone conversation at 2:11 p.m. that the
Sellers had revoked the Counteroffer, Mr. Olch advised Mrs. Olch of the revocation some time
after 2:15 p.m. (the first point at which he could have learned of the third-party back-up offer)
and some time before about 3:25 p.m. (the point at which Mrs. Olch communicated to Mr. Olch
the Buyer's "acceptance" of the Counteroffer).
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It is clear as a matter of permissible and plausible inference, therefore, that the Oldies'
claim that neither the Buyer's agent (Mrs. Olch) nor subagent (Doordan) knew of the Sellers'
revocation until after the Buyer had accepted the Counteroffer is false. It is a claim that is
contradicted by direct testimonial and documentary evidence, by reasonable inferences from that
evidence, and by plain common sense. The obvious conflict in the evidence is fatal to the
Summary Judgment Orders.
C.

THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT THE EARLIEST POINT AT WHICH THE
BUYER COMPLETED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE COUNTEROFFER IN THE
MANNER REQUIRED BY THE COUNTEROFFER WAS APPROXIMATELY
3:25 P.M. ON JANUARY 27. 1994, BECAUSE THE RECORD IS UNCLEAR
WHETHER THE SELLERS' NOTICE OF REVOCATION TO THE BUYER'S
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT "NO LATER THAN 3:25 P.M." PRECEDED OR
FOLLOWED THE BUYER'S ATTEMPTED ACCEPTANCE. THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ORDERS CANNOT STAND.
It is settled Utah law that "[i]n making an offer, the offeror may specify the manner in

which the offer must be accepted. If the offer is not accepted in the specified manner, mutual
assent is lacking and no contract is formed." Crane v. Timberbrook Village. Ltd.. 774 P.2d 3,
4 (Utah App. 1989). Accord. J. R. Stone Co. v. Keate. 576 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah 1978). As
this Court has explained:
Under basic contract theory, generally a contract arises from the time that the
agent of the offeree communicates the acceptance of his principal to the offeror.
These general rules, however, may be modified by the express terms of the offer.
'If the offeror prescribes the only way in which his offer must be accepted, an
acceptance in any other way is a counteroffer.'
Frandsen v. Gerstner. 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971). In Frandsen. the offer specified that it
was made "subject to the written acceptance of the [offeree] endorsed hereon." Rather than
18

signing the offer, however, the offeree telegraphed his "acceptance" to his real estate agent. The
agent then attached the telegram to the offer and wrote "accepted as per terms of [t]elegram."
In reversing the trial court's decision that a contract had been formed, the Court held that
because "defendants have never endorsed their acceptance of the offer," and because there was
no written instrument authorizing their agent to accept the offer on their behalf, there was no
basis for specific performance. 487 P.2d at 700.
The rationale for the principle that any variance between the prescribed method of
acceptance and the actual attempt at acceptance is fatal to the formation of a contract is that "the
offeror is the master of his offer, and his provision as to the time, place and manner or mode
of acceptance must be complied with." Glenwav Indus.. Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frve. Inc.. 686
F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting Van Schoiack v. United States Liab. Ins. Co.. 133 A.2d
509 (Pa. 1957). In other words, "[a]s he is free not to make any offer at all, a person making
an offer is free to restrict the power of acceptance in any way, reasonable or unreasonable, that
he may wish." Kurio v. United States. 429 F. Supp. 42, 64 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Thus, until the
offeree accepts the offer in the precise manner prescribed by the offeror, no contract is formed.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 60 ("If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of
acceptance, its terms in this respect must be complied with in order to create a contract.").
This principle defeats the Buyer's claim that he somehow "accepted" the Counteroffer
before 3:25 p.m. on January 27, 1994. The Counteroffer expressly required the occurrence of
two specified events before any "acceptance" could arise: (i) the Buyer must have signed the
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Counteroffer to indicate his acceptance, and (ii) the Buyer must have communicated to the
Sellers or their agent that the Counteroffer had been so signed. (Counteroffer, t 23). Although
the Buyer asserts that he orally accepted the Counteroffer at 1:55 p.m., and that his agent,
Mrs. Olch, informed the Sellers' agent, Mr. Olch, of that oral acceptance at "approximately
2:11 p.m.," see R. 125, it is obvious that the attempted oral "acceptance" could not and did not
constitute a legally sufficient acceptance in the express manner required by paragraph 23 of the
Offer. That paragraph states that unless and until the Buyer signed the Counteroffer to indicate
acceptance (an act that indisputably occurred at 2:50 p.m.) (R. 138) and communicated to the
Sellers or their agent that the Counteroffer had been signed as required (an act that indisputably
occurred at "approximately 3:25 p.m.") (R. 125) no acceptance arose. Because the Buyer's oral
acceptance of the Counteroffer at 1:55 p.m. and his agent's notification to the Buyer's agent of
the oral acceptance at 2:11 p.m. preceded the Buyer's written acceptance of the Counteroffer
at 2:50 p.m. and his agent's communication of the acceptance to the Buyer's agent at
"approximately 3:25 p.m.," the earliest point at which the Counteroffer was accepted in the
manner specified by the Offer was "approximately 3:25 p.m."

Whether that acceptance

preceded or followed the notice of revocation that Doordan telephonically read to the Buyer's
administrative assistant and telefaxed to the Buyer "no later than 3:25 p.m." is not resolvable
through summary judgment.
In the final analysis, the parties contractually specified the precise manner in which
acceptance was to occur: the affixing of the Buyer's signature to the Counteroffer to indicate
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acceptance and actual "communication" to the Sellers or their agent of the acceptance. As such,
the earliest point at which a legally valid acceptance could have occurred was "approximately
3:25 p.m." Because the record does not establish whether the Buyer's completion of his
acceptance at "approximately 3:25 p.m." occurred before or after Doordan telephonically read
to the Buyer's administrative assistant and faxed the notice of revocation to the Buyer "no later
than 3:25 p.m.," see R. 588-90, 603, 616, 620, 623-24, 633-34, the Summary Judgment Orders
must be reversed.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment Orders and the Specific Performance Judgment cannot stand.
The Sellers' notice of revocation to the assistant of the Buyer's agent at 2:02 p.m. on January
27, 1994 constitutes notice to the Buyer more than one hour before he completed his attempted
acceptance. For this reason, the Summary Judgment Orders and the Specific Performance
Judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the Sellers as a matter of law.
Alternatively, the myriad factual disputes regarding the sequence, timing and substance of the
parties' and their agents' conversations during that remarkable afternoon can be resolved only
through a plenary development of the relevant facts at trial. For this reason, the Summary
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Judgment Orders and Specific Performance Judgment must be reversed and the case remanded
for trial.
DATED this /ST day of April, 1996.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

*4*-^

John TXAnderson
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^

day of April, 1996,1 caused two true and correct copies

of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to be mailed, via first-class, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Bryon J. Benevento, Esq.
Guy P. Kroesche, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Mark J. Williams, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
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Addendum A

VAN COST, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Bryon J. Benevento (5254)
Guy P. Kroesche (4749)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. WALTER,

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
PLAINTIFF

v.

' ;
i
]1
1
;

WALTER J. and RIA N. BERKUS,

] i.

Civil No. 94-03-00046CN

])

Honorable Glenn Iwasaki

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court
for oral argument on Thursday, December 1, 1994.
represented by Bryon J. Benevento.
by John T. Anderson.

Plaintiff was

Defendants were represented

The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki presided.

Based upon the parties' motions for summary judgment, the
memorandums submitted in support and opposition to the crossmotions for summary judgment, the affidavits of Janet Olch and

Kate Doordan, oral argument of counsel and for other good cause
appearing thereon;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is

2.

Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment on his

denied.

First Claim for Relief (Specific Performance) is granted in
part.

The Court finds as a matter of law the following:
a.

That Bald Eagle Realty and Jon Olch were

defendants' real estate agents.
b.

That Janet Olch was plaintiff s real estate

sales agent.
c.

That Janet 01,ch was an independent

contractor and not an employee of Bald Eagle Realty.
As such, she was not imputed with any knowledge that
Bald Eagle Realty or Jon Olch may have had relating
to defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer.
d.

That Janet Olch did not have knowledge of

defendants' attempt to revoke the counteroffer until
after she had communicated plaintiff s acceptance of
the counteroffer to defendants' agent.

I
i!

I

196X67979 i
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e.

That Janet 01ch was not serving in a dual

representative capacity for both the plaintiff and
defendants.
f.

That Bald Eagle Realty and/or Jon Olch were

not serving in a dual representative capacity for
both the plaintiff and defendants.
3.

The Court takes under advisement the issue of

whether plaintiff was notified directly by Bald Eagle Realty of
defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his
acceptance.

Defendants are ordered to submit a supplemental

brief on this limited issue by December 7, 1994.
plaintiff shall submit a reply
DATED this

^7

Thereafter,

brief by December 12, 1994.

day of December, 1994.
BY THE CO

HONORABLE GLENN IWASAKI
Third Judicial District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

/date

vu^X.*~ac-*
John T. Anderson
Attorneys for Defendants
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e.

That Janet 01ch was not serving in a dual

representative capacity for both the plaintiff and
defendants.
f.

That Bald Eagle Realty and/or Jon 01ch were

not serving in a dual representative capacity for
both the plaintiff and defendants.
3.

The Court takes under advisement the issue of

whether plaintiff was notified directly by Bald Eagle Realty of
defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his
acceptance.

Defendants are ordered to submit a supplemental

brief on this limited issue by December 7, 1994.

Thereafter,

plaintiff shall submit a reply brief by December 12, 1994.
DATED this

C

1

day of December, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

AL

HONORABLE GLENN IWASAKI
Third Judicial District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

J ^

K^A^JJL^^^

John Tv Anderson
Attorneys for Defendants
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Addendum B

No.

FILED
OCT lb $95
dark of Summit County

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Bryon J. Benevento (52S4)
Guy P. Kroesche (4749)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1S00
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

ScprtyCUck

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. WALTER,
Plaintiff,

THE JAMES AND RIA N. BERKUS
LIVING TRUST, JAMES BERKUS
and RIA N. BERKUS, AS
GRANTORS AND TRUSTEES,

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No, 94-03-Q0046CN
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before
this Court for hearing on Monday, September 25, 1995.
Plaintiff was represented by Bryon J. Benevento.
were represented by John T. Anderson.

Defendants

Based upon this Court's

prior Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff,
the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff's
supporting memoranda, the Affidavits of Jeri Pacheco, Katie

196\S779S.l
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Jenkins, James Berkus and Joel Silver, the deposition
transcripts of Janet Olch, John Olch and Kate Doordan Klavan,
the Defendants' opposing memoranda, the pleadings on file with
the Court, oral argument of counsel, and for other good cause
appearing thereon;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.
granted.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is

Defendants have failed to present sufficient evidence j

to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

j

plaintiff was notified of defendants' attempt: to revoke their
counteroffer prior to his acceptance.

The record demonstrates |
!

that plaintiff was not informed of defendants' attempt to

j

revoke their counteroffer until after his acceptance was

J

communicated to defendants' real estate agent.

I

2.

I

The record further demonstrates that Katie
i

Jenkins was not plaintiff's agent for the purpose of receiving j
notice of defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer.

|

Accordingly, any facts disclosed to Ms. Jenkins cannot be

i

imputed to plaintiff.
3.

The record further demonstrates that Kate

J

Doordan Klavan was not plaintiff's subagent for the purpose of j
receiving notice of defendants' attempt to revoke their

i*\!779S.l

*
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counteroffer. Accordingly, any facts disclosed to Ms. Klavan
cannot be imputed to plaintiff.
4.

Defendants' arguments regarding the subject

matter of any communications between the parties' real estate
agents that allegedly occurred before plaintiff accepted the
counteroffer are mere speculation and do not create a genuine
issue of material fact upon which reasonable minds could
differ.
THEREFORE, this Court enters judgment on behalf of
the plaintiff and against defendants on his First Claim for
Relief for specific performance.
DATED this S

(C

p

day of r 7 V. ,

, 1995

BY THE COURT:

Frank G. Noel
Third District Court^
Approved as to form:
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

John T-. Anderson
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
3 '

day of SepssRfeer, 1995, to the following:
John T. Anderson
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway
700 Bank One Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Bryon J. Benevento, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145-0340
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F ILED
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Bryon J. Benevento (5254)
Craig W. Dallon (5940)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
3
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

DEC 1 5 1975 |d '.06
GierK or Summit County

y

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. WALTER,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE

vs.
THE JAMES AND RIA N. BERKUS
LIVING TRUST, JAMES BERKUS
and RIA N. BERKUS, AS
GRANTORS AND TRUSTEES,

Civil No. 94-03-00046CN
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

JAMES BERKUS and RIA Nt
BERKUS,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
BALD EAGLE REALTY, INC. , a
Utah corporation, JONATHAN
OLCH and KATE DOORDAN,
Third-Party Defendants.
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BASED UPON this Court's Order Granting Plaintiff
Summary Judgment of Specific Performance, Plaintiff is hereby
awarded judgment against Defendants as follows:
1.

Defendants shall convey to Plaintiff fee simple

title to the following real property:
Unit 14, THE BALD EAGLE CLUB AT DEER
VALLEY, an Expandable Utah Condominium
Project, together with an undivided l/53rd
ownership interest in and to the common
areas and facilities of the project as the
same are identified and established in the
Record of Survey Map recorded August 3,
1989 as Entry No. 311265 of the Official
Records in the office of the Summit County
Recorder, and recorded August 3, 1989 as
Entry No. 149482 in Book 210 at Page 359 of
the Official Records in the office of the
Wasatch County Recorder; and the
Declaration of Condominium for The Bald
Eagle Club at Deer Valley recorded August
3, 1989 as Entry No. 311266 in Book 530 at
Page 295 of the Official Records in the
office of the Summit County Recorder and
recorded August 3, 1989 as Entry No. 149483
in Book 210 at Page 389 of the Official
Records in the office of the Wasatch County
Recorder; and the First Amendment to Record
of Survey Map recorded April 18, 1990 as
Entry No. 151947 in Book 217 at Page 479 of
the Official Records in the office of the
Wasatch County Recorder and recorded April
20, 1990 as Entry No. 323408 of the
official records in the office of the
Summit County Recorder and the First
Amendment to Condominium Declaration
recorded April 18, 1990 as Entry No. 151948
in Book 217 at Page 499 of the Official
Records in the office of the Wasatch County
Recorder and recorded April 20, 1990 as
Entry No. 323409 in Book 561 at Page 653 in
the office of the Summit County Recorder,
196V88947 1
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and the First Amendment to Record of Survey
Map for an Expandable Condominium Project
called The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley
recorded August 21, 1990 as Entry No.
153081 in Book 221 at Page 230 of the
Official Records in the office of the
Wasatch County Recorder and recorded August
21, 1990 as Entry No. 328322 of the
Official Records in the office of the
Summit County Recorder.
2.

Plaintiff shall pay the Defendants the amount

of $967,350.00 ($940,000.00 as the purchase price and
$27,350.00 as interest under the Bellevue Condominium Escrow)
in consideration for the conveyance of the real property
referenced in paragraph 1 above from which the sum of
$56,400.00, which represents the commission claimed by Bald
Eagle Realty, shall be paid into the Registry of the Court, and
held in an interest-bearing account subject to a final
disposition of the Third-Party Complaint by order of this
Court.
3.

The closing of the conveyance (the "Closing")

shall be held at the offices of High Country Title (the "Escrow
Agent"), at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on or before the *eth day of
1>

Naa^mbor, 1995, or at such other place and time as shall be
mutually agreed to, in writing, by the Plaintiff and the
Defendants.

The date upon which the Closing actually takes

place or, if more than one (1) day is required to complete the
Closing, the date upon which the Closing is actually
196X88947.1
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accomplished, shall be deemed and considered the "Closing
Date."

At the Closing, the following shall occur, each of

which shall be considered a condition precedent to the other
and all of which shall be considered as taking place
simultaneously:
a.

The Defendants shall execute and deliver to

the Escrow Agent, in escrow, a general warranty deed
for the subject property.
b.

The Plaintiff shall deliver to the Escrow

Agent, in escrow, the consideration for the subject
property.
c.

The Defendants and the Plaintiff shall

execute and deliver to each other such other
documents (including without limitation closing
statements) and take such other actions as necessary
and appropriate to effectuate the Closing in
accordance herewith and with the Real Estate Purchase
Contract.
4.

The Plaintiff shall reasonably cooperate with

the Defendants to effectuate an exchange of the subject
property in accordance with the provisions of Section 1031 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the

196X88947 1
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regulations promulgated thereunder, subject to the following
limitations:
a.

The Plaintiff shall incur no additional

costs or expenses in connection with the exchange;
b.

The purchase and sale of the subject

property shall not be delayed by reason of the
exchange; and
c.

The Plaintiff shall have no responsibility

to ensure the Defendants' intended tax consequences.
5.

Defendants' Counterclaim against Plaintiff is

dismissed with prejudice.
6.

Plaintiff shall be awarded his Court costs and

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this matter
to judgment as established by affidavit of counsel

DATED this

/^j

day of

V)J&U

1995

J

BY THE COURT

^-^

Approved as to form:

Frank G. Noe
Third District

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

| * \ COUNTY / £ !
WAA-^

John^T. Anderson
Attorney for Defendants

'""/flllUO^

HANSONf EPPERSON & SMITH

Mark J .
Attorney 'for T h i r d - P a r t y Defendants
~#**i#t \ w mnr

i. h Q

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing JUDGMENT OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE to be mailed, postage prepaid, this

/^$T^-day of

^__No2cejlS^er, 1995, to the following:
John T. Anderson
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway
700 Bank One Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Bryon J. Benevento, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145-0340

( Q j i W L - k/. ^*MA/1teD
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Addendum D

6.2.7.3 Disclosure to other agents. An agent who has established an agency
relationship with a principal shall disclose who he or she represents to another agent
upon initial contact with the other agent
11/15/93
6.2.8 Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate brokers must keep their principal
broker or branch manager informed on a timely basis of all real estate transactions in
which the licensee is involved, as agent or principal, in which the licensee has received
funds on behalf of the principal broker or in which an offer has been written.
10/18/91
6.2.9 Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and associate brokers who are branch
managers shall be responsible for exercising active supervision over the conduct of all
licensees affiliated with them.
10/18/91
6.2.9.1 A broker will not be held responsible for inadequate supervision if:
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Section 61-2-1, et seq.* or the rules
promulgated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising broker's specific written
policies or instructions; and
3/1/94
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the broker to ensure that licensees
receive adequate supervision and the broker has followed those procedures; and
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker attempted to prevent or mitigate the
damage; and
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and
(f) The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the violation.

10/18/91

6.2.9.2 The existence of an independent contractor relationship or any other special
compensation arrangement between the broker and affiliated licensees shall not release
the broker and licensees of any duties, obligations, or responsibilities,
10/18/91
6.2.10 Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who is acting as an agent in a
transaction will receive any type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction in
addition to a real estate commission, that fee must be disclosed in writing to all parties
to the transaction.
10/18/91
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_
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
^ Q & WAUTeufe,
offers to purchase the Property described below and delivers
The Bo
.np^^rTcl.^M^r.»^i»tbC>.Cg>0
Inthefonnof^hP^.-TRf^fr^iS
tobedepositcd
within three business days after Acceptance of this offer to purchase by alt parties.
•]Wj>> g A / ^ L ^ ^ f ^ O t r /
Brokerage
'

t. WQPBTV. \\fAvr

U o J S - R c c c i v c d by
Phone Number
OFFERTO PURCHASE

°"

m- T ^ A U ^ r A ^ ^ . ^ ^ A

(Date)

——-

Htv A m u
r\Vvl
County S ^ P P i IT" ? U P A ^ ^ r r C H
Utah.
II Included Items Utiiess excluded herein, thiaaale shall include all fixtures presently attached to the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning
and venting fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window
and door screens, storm doors, window Winds, awnings, installed lelevision antenna, satellite dishes and system, wall-to-wail carpets, automatic garage
door opener and transmiiicrO). fencing, trees and shrubs. The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate
Bill of Sole with warranties as to title: A / t e » l / ^ - .
'
1.2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale .
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows:
S S O j f l p O ' * * * Earnest Money Deposit
i
<3
Existing Loam Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan in this approximate amount presently payable at S.
per month including principal. Interest (presently at
% per annum), D real estate taxes. D property insurance premium
and D mortgage insurance premium. Buyer agreea to pay any transfer and assumptton fees. Seller O shall O shall not be
released from liability on said loan. Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual
balance at Closing shall be adjusted In DCash P Other
!S
Q
Proceeds from New Loan: Buyer reserves therightto apply for any of the following loons under the terms described below.
• Conventional O PHA DVA D Other
. Seller agrees to pay $
toward
Discount Points and Buyer's other loan and closing costs, to be allocated at Buyer's discretion.
Q For a fixed rate loan: Amortized and payable over
years, interest shall not exceed
% per annum; monthly principal
and interest payment shall not exceed *
. or
G For tin Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Amortized and payable over _____ years; initial interest rair shall noi exceed
%
per annum: initial monthly principal and interest payments shall not exceed $
Maximum Life Time interest
rate shall not exceed
. % per annum.
S_j£L
Seller Financing: (See attached Seller Financing Addendum)
1
O
Other:
SCSQ^CCQL
Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing

s&bQsQQ-

Total Purchase Price

2.1 £«i*llng/New Loan Application. Buyer agrees to make application for a loan specified above within A/Ar calendar days (Application Date)
altct Acceptance. Buyer will hove made l»au Application only when Buyer has: (a) completed, signed, ond delivered m the Lender the initial loan
application and documentation required by the Lender; and (b) paid nil loan application fees as required by the Lender Buyer will continue to provide
the Lender with my additional documentation as required by the* Lender. If. within seven calendar days after receipt of written request from Seller, Buyer
tails to provide in Seller written evidence that Buyer has made taan Application by the Application Date, (hen Seller may. prior IO the Qualification
Date below, cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Buyer. The Brokerage, upon receipt of atopy of such written notice. Muill release to Seller,
and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization f rtmi
Buyer
1.2 Qualification Buyer and the Property must qualify for a loan for which application has been made under Section 2.1 within A/A calendar
days (Qualification D«t*i after Acceptance The Property is deemed qualified If. on or before the Qualification Date, the Property , in tu current
condition and for the Buyer's intended use, has appraised at a value not less than the Total Purchase Price. Buyer is deemed qualified If. on or before the
Qualification Date, the lender verifies in writing that Buyer has been approved as of the verification date.
2.3 Qualification Contingency. If Seller lias not previously voided this Contract as provided in Section 2.1. and either the Property or Buyer has
failed to qualify on or before the Qualification Date, either party may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party within three
calendar days after the Qualification Date, otherwise Buyer and the Property are deemed qualified. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of such written
notice, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further wntten authorization of Seller.
3. CLOSING. This transaction shall be closed on or belore
I " $\
. 19 " 4 Closing shall occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have
signed arid delivered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions
and by applicable law; and (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents, have been delivered to the escrow/title company in the form of
cashier s chock, collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the escrow Closing fee, unless otherwise agreed by die parties
in writing. Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in this Section. Unearned
deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing. Prorations set forth in this Section, shall be made as of SSf date of Closing O date of
possession Pother
4. POSSESSION. Unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer WMNN AT
hmin ..ft- Closing.
5. CON Fl RM ATION OF AGENCY DISC LOSUR E. At the signing of this Contract th(llsting agent UaJ £ ) I C U
represents
0 Seller OBuver. and the selling agem^lA_KJ*r C)\CM
mpn^nt. •Sejlal|pBuyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this
Contract written disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. C1 f If IP Buyer's Initials. (
) Seller's Initials.
6. TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE, (a) Seller has. or ahall h a ^ l t Cloiing. Zee title to the Property and agrees to convey such
title to Buyer by general warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted under Section (0.6; (b) Seller agrees to pay for and furnish Buyer
at Closing with a current standard form owner'a policy of Utle insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price; (c) the title policy shall conform with
Sellers obligations under subsections (a) and (b) above. Unless otherwise agreed under subsecUon 8.4, the Commitment shall conform with the title
insurance Commitment provided under Section 7.
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than 7 calendar days after Acceptance. Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures: (a)
a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and doted by Seller, (b) a Commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section
6, to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller, including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment; (c) a copy
of all loon documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber the Property after Closing; and (d) a copy of all leases affecting the Property
not expiring prior to Closing Seller agrees to pay any title Commitment cancellation charge under subsection (b).
8. GENERAL CONTINGENCIES. In addition to Qualification under Section 2.2 this offer is: (a) subject to Buyer's approval of the content of each
of the items referenced in Section 7 above; and (b) Q Is 2?is not subject to Buyer's approval of an inspection of the Property. The inspection shall be
paid for by Buyer and shall he conducted by on individual/company of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to fully cooperate with such inspection and a walkthrough inspection under Section 11 and to make the Property available for the same.
8.1 Buyer shall hove tjfo calendar days after Acceptance in which to review the content of Seller Disclosures, and, if the inspection contingency
applies, to complete and evaluate the inspection of the Property, and to determine, if, In Buyer's sole discretion, the content of all Seller Disclosures
(including the Property Inspection) is acceptable.
8.2 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure or the Property Inspection within the time provided in
subsection 8.1 above, that document or inspection will be deemed approved or waived by Buyer.
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shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's ob>
». If Buyer s objections are not resolved witmn uic a w w«.v
~r
\
by providing written notice to Seller within the same seven calendar days. The Brokerage, upon areceiptof a copy off •. y ' written "^^f?^*™ R 1 " " 1
to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization from Seller. If this contract is not voided by Buyer,
Buyer's objection is deemed to have been waived. However, this waiver does not affect those items warranted in Section i 1.
8.4 Resolution of Buyers objections under Section 8.3 shall be in writing and shall be specifically enforceable as covenants of Uiis Contract.
9. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to:
The terms of attached Addendum *
i
are incorporated into this Contract by this reference.
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited to the following:
10.1 When Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings;
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbedfixtures,heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler
systems, appliances andfireplacesin working order,
10.3 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller,
10.4 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Property in working order and in
compliance with governmental regulations;
10.5 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property;
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring current allfinancialobligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge
all such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed; and
10.7 As of Cloning, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Property
which has not been resolved.
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing, Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the
Property to determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1,10.2,10.3 and 10.4 are in the warranted condition and to verify items
included in Section 1.1 are presently on the Property. If any item is not in the warranted condition. Seller will correct, repair or replace it as necessary
or, with the consent of Buyer, escrow an amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement. The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through"
inspection, or to claim during the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1.1, or is not in the condition
warranted in Section 10. shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of Buyer'srightsunder Section i. 1 or of the warranties contained in Section 10.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be-made, no new leases entered into, and no
substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of Buyer.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person executing this Contract
on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute the entire Contract
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and ail prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties.
This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the
Earnest Money Deposit, the breach or termination of this Contract, or the services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted to mediation in
accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall include representations made
by the parties, any Broker or other person or entity in connection with the sale, purchase,financing,condition or other aspect of the Property to which
this Contract penains. including without limitation, allegations of concealment, misrepresentation, negligence and/or fraud. Each pany agrees to bear
its own costs of mediation. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to toe mediation shall be binding. If mediation fails, the procedures applicable
and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this SeeiMnv Sshall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending
mediation. By marking this box J^, and adding their initials, the Buyer \Vvi\V and the Seller (
), agree that mediation under this Section IS is nut
mandatory, but is optional upon agreement of all parties.
f^"
16. DEFAULV. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money
Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept
from Seller as liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit, or to sue Seller for specific performance end/or damages. If Buyer elects
to accept the liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific
remedy the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless ofrightswhich might otherwise be available under common law.
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
18. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized by: (a) Section 2, Section 8.3
or Section 15; (b) separate written agreement of the parties; or (c) court order.
19. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing.
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damnge to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing
by all parties. Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the
stated date.
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile
transmission, shall be the same as delivery of an original. If the transaction involves multiple Buyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be
executed in counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other; (a) signs the offer or counter
wliere noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as
required.
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If Seller does not accept
this offer by 5
D AM 5tPM Mountain Time
\\\*l
1 9 * i 4 . this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money
Depositjp/Buyer.

)fler Date)
date)
(Offer
(Buyer's Signature)
The above date shall be the Offer Reference Date.

(Notice Address)

(Phone)

(Offer Dale)

(Notice Address)

(Phone)

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/CQUNTER OFFER
CHECK ONE*.
D Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.

(Sellers Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Notice Address)
(Notice Address)
D Rejections Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.
(Seller's initials)
Pate)
(Time)
Gf Counter Offer:
er: Seller
Sella presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified in the attached
Counter Offer

*JL,
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